



Long Work Hours: Volunteers and Conscripts

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Are Long Hours a Problem?

- Schor: *Overworked American* 1991
 - Jacobs & Gerson: *Time Divide* 2005

 - Preferred/Usual hours mismatch most severe for long hours employees, but...
 - Has only been studied in cross-sectional context
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Theories of Long Hours

- Choice theory: wages, human capital, income effects, gender/children, promotion tournaments, cost-of-job-loss(CJL)
 - But CJL does not fit long hours → mobility
 - Bargaining power: unions, public sector, ?self-employment?
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Theories of Long Hours (cont.)

- Consumerism: work-and-spend cycle or trap (Schor)
 - Ideal worker norm: managers & professionals, highly educated, 24/7 commitment
 - Ideal workers as 'true believers' or 'trapped' by norm?
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Long Hours Dynamics

- Choice theory: get what want, at least over time
 - Bargaining Power: reduces conscript status over time
 - Consumerism/Ideal worker norm: stability implies persistent volunteers, norms as norms imply some level of rejection at point and over time
 - Calls to abandon norms → increasing rejection
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HILDA DATA

Long Hours Volunteers: ≥ 50 hours, prefer ≥ 50

Long Hours Conscripts: ≥ 50 hours, but prefer
<50PHt

Short Hours: <50 hours

Balanced panel $n=5,857$, Waves 2-4

?How long-lived is Conscript status?

<i>WAVE 2 to 4 PATTERNS</i>	(%)
<i>Long Hours Volunteers</i>	12.0
Persistent Volunteer	
Volunteer→Conscript	
Volunteer→Short Hours	
<i>Long Hours Conscripts</i>	10.6
Persistent Conscript	
Conscript→Volunteer	
Conscript→Short Hours	
<i>Short Hours</i>	77.5
Persistent Short Hours	
Short Hours→Volunteer	
Short Hours→Conscript	

<i>WAVE 2 to 4 PATTERNS</i>	(%)
<i>Long Hours Volunteers</i>	
Persistent Volunteer	41.0
Volunteer→Conscript	
Volunteer→Short Hours	
<i>Long Hours Conscripts</i>	
Persistent Conscript	44.7
Conscript→Volunteer	
Conscript→Short Hours	
<i>Short Hours</i>	
Persistent Short Hours	89.8
Short Hours→Volunteer	
Short Hours→Conscript	

<i>WAVE 2 to 4 PATTERNS</i>	(%)
<i>Long Hours Volunteers</i>	
Persistent Volunteer	
Volunteer→Conscript	22.7
Volunteer→Short Hours	36.3
<i>Long Hours Conscripts</i>	
Persistent Conscript	
Conscript→Volunteer	21.2
Conscript→Short Hours	34.1
<i>Short Hours</i>	
Persistent Short Hours	
Short Hours→Volunteer	4.4
Short Hours→Conscript	5.8

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Wages & Mobility

Not used in analysis because simultaneous with hours/hours preferences, but:

Wages: highest for persistent volunteers,
lowest for volunteers→conscripts

Mobility: highest among short hours employees,
particularly short hours→conscripts

Regression Methods

Static analysis: Multinomial Logit, 3 cat.s

LH Volunteers, LH Conscripts

(Short hours omitted)

Dynamic analysis Waves 2, 4: Multi. Logit, 9 cat.s

Vol → Vol, Vol → Cons, Vol → Short hours, etc.

(Short hours → Short hours omitted)

Table 2A: Static Reg.s	Vol. Coeff.	Con. Coeff.
Completed Year 12	-0.328	-0.449*
Year 11 or below	0.046	-0.620**
Female parent	-2.617**	-1.517**
Female non-parent	-1.289**	-0.579**
Traditional man	0.492*	0.087
Promotion	0.571**	0.818**
Cost of job loss	-0.005**	-.002

Note: Includes non-significant Post-school diploma, Trade certificate, Rest of household income, Male parent, Neotraditional man, Female non-parent partner not FT, and Table 2b vars.

Table 2b: Static Reg.s	Vol. Coeff.	Con. Coeff.
Public sector	-0.416**	-0.387**
Self employed	1.008**	1.132**
Debt / income ratio	0.006	0.019**
Ideal worker	0.189	0.369*

Table 2b: Static Reg.s	Vol. Coeff.	Con. Coeff.
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Table 3A: Dynamic Reg.s	Persist Vol	Vol → Con	Vol → Short	Persist Con
Post-school diploma				0.801*
Rest of hh income			-4.77×10^{-6} *	
Traditional man	0.829*			
Neotraditional man				0.779*
Promotion		1.144**		0.950**
Public sector	-0.588*	-0.908**		
Self employed	1.471**	1.349**	0.833**	1.292**
Debt / income ratio				0.034**
Ideal worker		1.635*		1.181**

Table 3b: Dynamic Reg.s	Con → Vol	Con → Short	Short → Con
Trade certificate		-0.701*	
Year 11 or below	-0.936*	-1.133**	
Male parent	0.897*		
Promotion	1.033**	0.806**	
Public sector	-0.612*		
Self-employed	1.229**	1.237**	0.586**
Debt / income ratio	0.031**		0.037**

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Conclusions

By construction: some long hours voluntary, some not. Long hours not always problem

Wages: Low education → Short hours

Women do not work long hours

Breadwinner/married fathers → Volunteers

Not so for neotraditional men

Promotion effects complex

Cost of job loss → Lowest for long hours vol.s

Conclusions (cont.)

Bargaining power → less long hours, but

Self-employed → Con.s and Vol.s and movement

Debt → Conscripts, persistent, move into, but
sometimes become volunteers

Ideal workers → Conscripts, persistent and move
into

⇒ Consumerism/Ideal worker as norms
